## 2AC

**T**

**We meet – we give the industry money and tax credits**

**Epa.gov 12** [“Solar Power Purchase Agreements,” May 24th, <http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/buygp/solarpower.htm>]

A Solar Power Purchase Agreement (SPPA) is a financial arrangement in which a third-party developer owns, operates, and maintains the photovoltaic (PV) system, and a host customer agrees to site the system on its roof or elsewhere on its property and purchases the system’s electric output from the solar services provider for a predetermined period. This financial arrangement allows the host customer to receive stable, and sometimes lower cost electricity, while the solar services provider or another party acquires valuable financial benefits such as tax credits and income generated from the sale of electricity to the host customer.

**DoE says we’re T**

**Waxman 98 –** Solicitor General of the US (Seth, Brief for the United States in Opposition for the US Supreme Court case HARBERT/LUMMUS AGRIFUELS PROJECTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)

2 On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

**Interpretation – incentives are the disbursement of public funds**

**Gielecki 1**, Mark, economist with the Energy Information Administration, Fred Mayes, Senior Technical Advisor for the coal, nuclear, and renewables program within the EIA, Lawrence Prete, retired from the EIA, [“Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy,” February, <http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/128_PURPA/Agency_Activities/EIA/Incentive_Mandates_and_Government.htm>]

Over the years, incentives and mandates for renewable energy have been used to advance different energy policies, such as ensuring energy security or promoting environmentally benign energy sources. Renewable energy has beneficial attributes, such as low emissions and replenishable energy supply, that are not fully reflected in the market price. Accordingly, governments have used a variety of programs to promote renewable energy resources, technologies, and renewable-based transportation fuels. (1) This paper discusses: (1) financial incentives and regulatory mandates used by Federal and State governments and Federal research and development (R&D), (2), (3) and (2) their effectiveness in promoting renewables. A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, Creating or expanding a market for producers. The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase the production or consumption of the good or service over what it otherwise would have been without the incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost loans. Research and development is included as a support program because its effect is to decrease cost, thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s) provided. (4)

**NG**

#### SMR key to help nuclear beat-out natural gas

Lamonica 12—Tech Review Writer. 20 years of experience covering technology and business (8/9/12, Martin, A Glut of Natural Gas Leaves Nuclear Power Stalled, [www.technologyreview.com/news/428737/a-glut-of-natural-gas-leaves-nuclear-power/](http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428737/a-glut-of-natural-gas-leaves-nuclear-power/))

The nuclear renaissance is in danger of petering out before it has even begun, but not for the reasons most people once thought. Forget safety concerns, or the problem of where to store nuclear waste—the issue is simply cheap, abundant natural gas.¶ General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt caused a stir last month when he told the Financial Times that it's "hard to justify nuclear" in light of low natural gas prices. Since GE sells all manner of power generation equipment, including components for nuclear plants, Immelt's comments hold a lot of weight.¶ Cheap natural gas has become the fuel of choice with electric utilities, making building expensive new nuclear plants an increasingly tough sell. The United States is awash in natural gas largely thanks to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking" technology, which allows drillers to extract gas from shale deposits once considered too difficult to reach. In 2008, gas prices were approaching $13 per million BTUs; prices have now dropped to around $3. ¶ When gas prices were climbing, there were about 30 nuclear plant projects in various stages of planning in the United States. Now the Nuclear Energy Institute estimates that, at most, five plants will be built by 2020, and those will only be built thanks to favorable financing terms and the ability to pay for construction from consumers' current utility bills. Two reactors now under construction in Georgia, for example, moved ahead with the aid of an $8.33 billion loan guarantee from the U.S. Department of Energy. ¶ What happens after those planned projects is hard to predict. "The question is whether we'll see any new nuclear," says Revis James, the director of generation research and development at the Electric Power Research Institute. "The prospects are not good."¶ Outside the United States, it's a different story. Unconventional sources of natural gas also threaten the expansion of nuclear, although the potential impact is less clear-cut. Around the world, there are 70 plants now under construction, but shale gas also looms as a key factor in planning for the future. Prices for natural gas are already higher in Asia and Europe, and shale gas resources are not as fully developed as they are the United States.¶ Some countries are also blocking the development of new natural gas resources. France, for instance, which has a strong commitment to nuclear, has banned fracking in shale gas exploration because of concerns over the environmental impact.¶ Fast-growing China, meanwhile, needs all the energy sources available and is building nuclear power plants as fast as possible.¶ Even in United States, of course, super cheap natural gas will not last forever. With supply exceeding demand, some drillers are said to be losing money on natural gas, which could push prices back up. Prices will also be pushed upward by utilities, as they come to rely on more natural gas for power generation, says James.¶ Ali Azad, the chief business development officer at energy company Babcock & Wilcox, thinks the answer is making nuclear power smaller, cheaper, and faster. His is one of a handful of companies developing small modular reactors that can be built in three years, rather than 10 or more, for a fraction of the cost of gigawatt-size reactors. Although this technology is not yet commercially proven, the company has a customer in the Tennessee Valley Authority, which expects to have its first unit online in 2021 (see "A Preassembled Nuclear Reactor").¶ "When we arrive, we will have a level cost of energy on the grid, which competes favorably with a brand-new combined-cycle natural gas plants when gas prices are between $6 to $8," said Azad. He sees strong demand in power-hungry China and places such as Saudia Arabia, where power is needed for desalination.¶ Even if natural gas remains cheaper, utilities don't want to find themselves with an overreliance on gas, which has been volatile on price in the past, so nuclear power will still contribute to the energy mix. "[Utilities] still continue [with nuclear] but with a lower level of enthusiasm—it's a hedging strategy," says Hans-Holger Rogner from the Planning and Economics Studies section of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "They don't want to pull all their eggs in one basket because of the new kid on the block called shale gas."

**Waste**

**And, mass nuclear waste release has the environmental impact of a nuclear war**

**Ayala ‘3**

(Leah Ayala, “Nuclear Power Companies the Department of Energy: A Legal Remedy Magnifying Nuclear Ends”, Nevada Law Journal, Winter 2002, LexisNexis)

A very small amount of nuclear waste can be disastrous. If an amount of plutonium about the same size as a beach ball was properly dispersed, it could cause lung cancer in everyone on earth. R. Routley & V. Routley, Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future, 21 INQUIRY 133, 136 (1978). See generally Robin Dusek, Lost in Space?: The Legal Feasibility of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Outer Space, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 181 (1997). Some estimate that a large release of nuclear waste from Yucca Mountain, which has a capacity to hold 77,000 metric tons of waste, **would exceed the environmental impact of a nuclear war**. This is a huge amount of waste compared to the "few dozen pounds" of waste released in the Chernobyl explosion that is estimated will result in between 17,000 to 475,000 human deaths from cancer. Broad, supra note 132. Each of the spent fuel assemblies that will be stored in the repository contains a similar amount of radioactivity as ten Hiroshima bombs. Lazarus, supra note 1 (citing Klaus Schumann, a Green Party activist and member of the San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Waste Management Committee).

**No empirical basis for applying psychology to state action**

**Epstein**, senior lecturer in government and IR – University of Sydney, **‘10**

(Charlotte, “Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics,” European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from **social psychology** is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, ‘group self’, which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) ‘the state is simply a “group Self” capable of group level cognition’. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR’s fallacy of composition surfaces most clearly.

Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state

Wendt’s bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see nota­bly, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to psy­chological theories, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behav­iour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt’s ‘Ego’) behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbessian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human char­acteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual’s basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006).

For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state’s adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and val­ues, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as ‘in-’ or ‘out-group’ members and, from there, for orientating states’ self–other relationships.

Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other ‘non-rational’ phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of inter­national politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recog­nition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states.

The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost mecha­nistic, approach to non-rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the pre-social dimension of the concept of self that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respec­tive languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since posi­tive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer’s (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: posi­tive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination.

Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee’s ‘desire to belong’ in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where mean­ing is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War con­text, ‘identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the “Other”’. Perhaps so; but not if what ‘the other’ refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l’Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart’s (2006: 94) capitalization of the ‘Other’ actually holds.

The individual self as a proxy for the state’s self

Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entre­preneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more sus­ceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour.

To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is literally considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a proxy for the state, the ‘self’ of that person has been consistently taken as the reference point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt’s states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has con­sistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. **It has never ques­tioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place.** That is, what is left unexamined is this assumption is that what works for individuals will work for states too. This is IR’s central fallacy of composition, by which it has persistently eschewed rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear dem­onstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on **little more than a leap of faith**, or indeed an analogy.

**CP**

**DoD empirically does not implement energy policy recommendations**

**DSB 8**

Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, Feb 2008, More Figh -Less Fuel, www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf

Finding #1: The recommendations from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force Report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” have not been implemented.

The principal finding of the 2001 DSB report was that DoD systematically underestimates the cost of fuel to its tactical forces by failing to recognize the costs of the support structure and the protection necessary to bring that fuel to the systems that use it. As a consequence, significant warfighting, logistics and monetary benefits are available from making weapons systems more fuel-efficient, but those benefits are not valued or emphasized in DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes. The report found that the requirements process does not require energy efficiency in deployed systems, the acquisition process does not value it, so the PPBES process cannot not provide it visibility when considering investment decisions.

These findings remain valid today. Few of the recommendations of that study have been implemented to date. Those that have begun; making energy efficiency a selective Key Performance Parameter in system design, and using the fully burdened cost of fuel in life cycle costing of alternative systems; are in their early stages of implementation. Focused leadership will be required to complete the recommendations of the 2001 study and similar recommendations made herein.

**More evidence**

**King et. al. ’11** (Marcus King , LaVar Huntzinger , Thoi Nguyen, CNA Think Tank, Environment and Energy Team, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations”, March 31, 2011, LEQ)

Certification and licensing issues The most basic licensing issue relates to whether NRC will have jurisdiction over potential nuclear reactor sites or whether DoD could be **self-regulating**. Our conversations with NRC indicate it is the only possible licensing authority for reactors that supply power to the com- mercial grid. However, DOE and **DoD are authorized to regulate mission critical nuclear facilities under Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act**. **There is some historical precedent for DoD exercising this authority.** For example, the Army Nuclear Program was granted exception under this rule with regard to the reactor that operated aboard the Sturgis barge in the 1960s and 1970s.

**Sexual Difference**

**Our approach to the 1AC is valid**

**Owen ‘2**

(David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, **rational choice theory may provide the best account** available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that **because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes** theory-construction from **philosophical first principles,** **it cultivates a theory-driven** rather than problem-driven **approach** to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a **plurality of** possible **true descriptions** of a given action, event or phenomenon, **the challenge is** **to decide** **which is the most apt** in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist** program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the **mistaken belief** that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘**whether there are general explanations** for classes of phenomena **is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’**.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises**.

**5 - Victimology – irigary’s view of the feminine as weak ensures both domination over women and a racialized other**

**Butler 93** (Judith, hardcore bad ass, *Bodies That Matter* 47-49)

To claim, though, as Irigaray does, that the logic of identity is potentially disruptable by the insurgence of metonymy, and then to identify with metonymy with the repressed and insurgent feminine is to consolidate the place of the feminine in and as the irruptive chora, that which cannot be figure, but which is necessary for any figuration. That is, of course to figure that chora nevertheless, and in such a way that the feminine is “always” the outside, and the outside is “always” the feminine. This is a move that at once positions the feminine as the unthematizable the non-figurable, but which, in identifying the feminine with that position thematiczes and figures, and so makes use of the phallogeocentric exercise to produce this identity which “is” the non-identical. There are good reasons, however, to reject the notion that the feminine monopolizes the sphere of the excluded here. Indeed, to enforce such a monopoly redoubles the effect of foreclosure performed by the phallogocentric discourse itself, one which “mimes” its founding violence in a way that works against the explicit claim to have found a linguisitic site in metonym that works as disruption. After all, Plato’s scenography of intelligibility depends on the exclusion of women, slaves, children and animals, where slaves are characterized as those who do no speak his language and who, in not speaking his language, are considered diminished in their capacity for reason. This xenophobic exclusion operates through the production of racialized Others, and the whose “natures” are considered less rational by virtue of their appointed task in the process of laboring to reproduce the conditions of private life. This domain of the less than rational human bounds the figure of human reason, producing that “man” as one who is without a childhood; is not a primate and who is originary and untranslatable. This is a figure of disembodiment, but one which is nevertheless a figure of a body, a bodying forth of a masculinist rationality, the figure of a male body which is not a body, a figure in crisis, a figure that enacts a crisis cannot fully control. This figuration of masculine reason as disembodied body is one whose imaginary morphology is crafted through the exclusion of other possible bodies. This is a materialization of reason which operaties through the dematerialization of other bodies, for the feminine, strictly speaking, has no morphe, nor morphology, no contour, for it is that which contributes to the contouring of things, but is itself undifferentiated, without boundary. The body that is reason dematerializes the bodies that may not properly stand for reason or its replicas, and yet this is a figure in crisis, for this body of reason is itself the phatasmatic dematerialization of masculinity, one which requires that women and slaves, children and animals be the body, perform the bodily functions, that it will not perform. Irigaray does not always help matters here, for she fails to follow through the metonymic link between women and these other Others, idealizing and appropriating the “elsewhere” as the feminine. But what is the “elsewhere of Irigaray’s elsewhere? If the feminine is not the only or primary kind of being that is excluded from the economy of masculinist reason, what and who is excluded in the course of Irigaray’s analysis?

**Psychoanalysis can’t explain international politics**

**Sharpe**, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, **‘10**

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182 – 185, Figure 1.5 included)

Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of Žižek’s political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra- extremism of Žižek’s political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. **The differences between these** two **realms**, listed in Figure 5.1, **are** nearly **too many and too great to restate** – which has perhaps caused the **theoretical oversight**. The key thing is this. Lacan’s notion of traversing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people’s subjective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands’ voluntary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties.

As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. **But they do not transform the world.** The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a supporting moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully- fl edged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option (*b*), Žižek’s option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose ‘traversal of the fantasy’ is immediately identical with his transformation of the socio- political system or Other. Hence, according to Žižek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Žižek’s resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objective) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject–object, whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Žižek’s decisive political- theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1)

**The *substantive problem* is to equate any political change** worth the name **with** the **total change of the subject–object** that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial government, as Žižek now frankly avows (*IDLC* 412–19). We have seen that the ultra- political form of Žižek’s criticism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is sufficiently radical for him – even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Žižek’s model of politics proper is modelled on a pre- critical **analogy with** the total transformation of **a subject’s** entire **subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure.** For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be?

We have seen that Žižek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people. The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime’s ‘inherent transgressions’: at once subjects’ habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime’s myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete ‘traversal’ – in Hegel’s terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation – of all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of



entire new subject–objects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the fi rst Žižekian political subject was Schelling’s divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (*IDLC* 153; *OB* 144–8).

But can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all **in one world- creating moment?** And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not – for Žižek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways – what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?

**6 - Focus on inter-subjectivity stops the alt from success – it cannot confront the oppression of others**

**Lawtoo 6**

Nidesh University of Washington, (“Dissonant Voices in Richard Rodriguez's Hunger of Memory and Luce Irigaray's This Sex Which Is Not One” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 48.3 (2006) 220-249) Project Muse

Implicit in the "morphology" of Irigaray's schema, is a conscious evasion of the violence and contradictions which sustain dialectical thought. In fact, Irigaray's "vulvomorphic logic" (Gallop, 95) neither postulates a hierarchy between its constitutive poles, nor necessitates the presence of (sexual) "otherness" outside the (feminine) self. Thus understood, the feminine subject does not stem from a generative tension between self and other; inside and outside; subaltern subject and cultural hegemony. [28](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/texas_studies_in_literature_and_language/v048/48.3lawtoo.html#FOOT28) Put differently, the vaginal schema suggests that Irigaray's concern with the subject takes place at the level of intra-subjectivity and does not address the problem of inter-subjectivity. Since the other is "always already" within the self, Irigaray does not need to articulate a space for the encountering of others outside the self, in the wider social sphere. [29](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/texas_studies_in_literature_and_language/v048/48.3lawtoo.html#FOOT29) In fact, negotiation of identity, for the French feminist, takes place within the private dimension of a kind of autoerotic desire that is highly suspicious of sexual difference. [30](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/texas_studies_in_literature_and_language/v048/48.3lawtoo.html#FOOT30)

Moreover, despite Irigaray's claim that woman "is kept from dispersion because the other is already within her" (31), the "morphology" of Irigaray's epistemic model suggests that the contact between the two lips is not a contact with otherness but rather a symmetrical contact with an other that is the same. The articulation of what she calls a "multitude of 'selves'" is not generated by an asymmetrical tension with otherness (and the pain it involves) but rather by a pleasurable contiguity with sameness. Irigaray, thus, speaks of a pleasurable "contact" predicated upon a "*nonsuture of* [the] *lips*" (30) which guarantees a space for the affirmation of "the other in herself" (28). If on the one hand Irigaray's epistemic model promotes contact and continuity of identities, on the other hand what guarantees this continuity is a closure to and discontinuity with the cultural hegemony. Or, to put it in de Certeau's terms, the "vagina" initially appears to function as a bridge that connects. However, this bridge connects the subject with itself (i.e., with a "sameness" which is inside the feminine subject) rather than with "difference" outside the self. Further, the morphology of the "vagina" also suggests that this model functions as a frontier or boundary that divides sexual "sameness" from sexual "otherness" by establishing the absoluteness of the gender/sexual divide. [31](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/texas_studies_in_literature_and_language/v048/48.3lawtoo.html#FOOT31) Rosi Braidotti, in her overall positive assessment of Irigaray, puts it even more crudely as she writes that "Irigaray ends up upholding" the "metaphysics of the sexual dichotomy masculine feminine" (56). For our purpose, suffice it to say that implicit in the radical feminist's theoretical model of subjectivity is a disavowal of the necessity of a severe confrontation with the hegemonic, phallocentric order. [32](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/texas_studies_in_literature_and_language/v048/48.3lawtoo.html#FOOT32)

**7 - Alt can’t produce political change -**

Alison **Martin**, Leverhulme Special Fellow in the Department of French, University of Nottingham, **2004** (“A European Initiative: Irigaray, Marx, and Citizenship” *Hypatia* 19.3 (2004)) Project Muse

The stakes and aims of Irigaray's political project are clearly idealistic and ambitious. It is difficult to envisage how the fact of sexual difference can be represented in political institutions in a universalist fashion without revealing particular cultural traditions' perception of gender. Her philosophy of sexual difference does not call for a worldwide uniformity in the culture of sexual difference—quite the opposite—but the process of making rights and laws appropriate to women and men raises the problem of how to define and represent them in a manner that does not rule out those cultural differences. But in assuming at least the validity of the claim of sexual difference, this question is still a long way from dominant political thinking on gender in European legal institutions, which, to the extent that difference is an issue, seem bound to the ideal of equality.

**Feminist criticism is too insular and self-referential—its own methodology is suspect because it excludes all perspectives not from the margins**

**Jarvis**, lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations, Faculty at University of Sydney, **2000** (D.S.L, International relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, pg. 160-162)

Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. Critics of feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity group from legitimate participation in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of particular groups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encourage- ment, but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way, they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony over their own self, identification, insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, and standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are **self defined**. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls for a "homesteading" of International Relations she does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that *we be included on our terms*" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism. 93 Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of rein- venting the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identities-the most important of which is gender. 94 Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory." Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the disci- pline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectual-and well established-spaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is variously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as inter- generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical oppression, indicating an ontologically privileged group by which the historical expe- riences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, and exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been "silenced." In this same way, self identification or "self-situation" establishes one's credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the "authoritative" vantage point from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worlding Women, a section titled "A (personal) politics of location," in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes appar- ent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties. 96 Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, "It is impor- tant to provide a context for one's work in the often-denied politics of the personal." Accordingly, self declaration reveals to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to "develop your brains and confess something called 'sins' to always male forever priests," and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objec- tivity. Like territorial markers, self identification permits entry to intel- lectual spaces whose sovereign authority is "policed" as much by marginal subjectivities as they allege of the oppressors who "police" the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and "malestream" theory. If Sylvester's version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, per- spectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, in reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being

**Immigration**

**Won’t pass.**

**Porter 2-7**. [Eduardo, economics reporter, "2nd chance to overhaul immigration" International Herald Tribune -- lexis]

Despite the strong case for an overhaul, however, changing the United States' immigration laws may be tougher than the president appears to believe. While the administration may have overcome some of the same obstacles as in 2007, the proposed changes will probably face deep-seated opposition from many Americans - including most conservative Republicans - to what they will view as a potentially **large expansion of welfare.**¶ Mr. Obama's proposal is based on principles similar to those of the 2007 attempt: a path to citizenship for millions of illegal immigrants already in the United States, a legal channel for future immigrant workers and their families and a plan to better secure borders and enforce immigration laws.¶ Yet the necessary changes in immigration rules today are quite different from 2007. Notably, the elements needed to stop the flow of illegal immigrants north are much less important to the enterprise. The Obama administration has already spent huge amounts of money on border enforcement. And deportations have soared. What is more, illegal immigration has slowed to a trickle as the Mexican economy has grown more robustly than that of the United States. The illegal immigrant population has even been shrinking in the last few years. And it may continue to do so as the Mexican population of prime migration-age people stops growing.¶ Also, many employers have already gotten some of what they wanted: The number of workers entering the United States on temporary visas for low-end jobs in agriculture and other industries has increased sharply.¶ ''The discussion is in a different environment,'' said Gordon H. Hanson, an expert on the economics of immigration at the University of California, San Diego. ''The flow of new immigrants is not the story anymore.''¶ That might help the cause of change in some ways. It could allow the discussion about work visas to focus on the highly educated workers coveted by technology companies and pre-empt the kind of argument between business and labor over visas for cheap immigrant workers that sank the bill in 2007. The A.F.L.-C.I.O., for instance, has heartily embraced Mr. Obama's plan.¶ But what supporters of an overhaul of immigration law seem to be overlooking is that those very changes could also make it more difficult to build a coalition across the political divide. If change is mainly about granting citizenship to 11 million mostly poor illegal immigrants with relatively little education, it is going to land squarely in the cross hairs of the epic battle over taxes, entitlements and the role of government in American society.¶ It is hard to say with precision what effect offering citizenship would have on the budget, but the chances are good that it would cost the government money. Half to three-quarters of illegal immigrants pay taxes, according to studies reviewed in a 2007 report by the Congressional Budget Office. And they are relatively inexpensive, compared with Americans of similar incomes. Their children can attend public schools at government expense - putting a burden on state and local budgets. But they are barred from receiving U.S. government benefits like the earned-income tax credit, which benefits lower-income people; food stamps, a food subsidy program; and Medicaid, a health insurance program for the poor. Only their American-born children can get those.¶ Government revenue might not change much with legalization. Most illegal immigrants who do not pay taxes probably work in the cash economy - as nannies or gardeners - where tax compliance among citizens is also low. Costs, of course, would increase. Once they became citizens, immigrants would be entitled to the same array of government benefits as other Americans. Just for Social Security, which provides benefits to retirees and disabled people, and Medicare, a health insurance program for the elderly, offering citizenship to illegal immigrants would mean losing a subsidy worth several billion dollars a year in payroll taxes from immigrants who cannot collect benefits in old age.¶ The White House and other backers of an overhaul have made much of a 2007 analysis by the Congressional Budget Office concluding that the failed immigration bill would have increased government revenue by $48 billion over a decade while adding only $23 billion to direct spending on entitlements and other programs. But the report also said that with the costs of carrying out the new law, it would have actually increased the budget deficit by $18 billion over the decade and several billion a year after that. What is more, it noted that most of the expected new tax revenue would have come from new immigrant workers, not from the population of those with newly legal status.¶ History suggests the United States could have much to gain by turning illegal immigrants into citizens and putting an end to unauthorized immigration. The last time the United States permitted illegal immigrants to gain legal status, in 1986, incomes jumped for those who took advantage of the opportunity. Their children became more proficient in English and completed more years of school - becoming more productive and paying more taxes over their lifetimes.¶ But the same history underscores how immigration sets off fears about further sharing of government resources. Ten years after the immigration overhaul of 1986, reeling from public anger, Congress passed a law barring legal immigrants from means-tested government services. **The issue is likely to be a major flash point again**. Dr. Hanson, of the University of California, San Diego, pointed to ''the older white man who sees his entitlements at risk because of the demands placed by legalization on our fiscal resources.''¶ Conservative Republicans set on cutting government spending share those concerns. And for all their reasons to reach out to Hispanics, they might not find giving illegal immigrants legal status politically advantageous. On Tuesday, Republicans in the House argued against granting citizenship to illegal immigrants at all.¶ Hispanics are more liberal than the general population on economic matters, polls suggest, and more supportive of Big Government initiatives. Granting them citizenship would give them the vote.¶ As Steven A. Camarota, director of research at the Center for Immigration Studies, an advocacy group in Washington that favors more limits on immigration, said, ''They will see legalization as a voter registration drive for Democrats.''

**Obama isn’t using political capital, and if he did it would fail**

**Rothman ‘1-29** (Obama Says Nothing In Presser, Saves Immigration Reform by Noah Rothman, political analyst and journalist, analyst with Mediaite.com, a news and opinion blog covering politics and entertainment in the media industry as well as other issues. It is the flagship blog of Abrams Media, a ring of blogs run by ABC legal analyst Dan Abrams 5:23 pm, January 29th, 2013

CNN reported on Monday that the Congressional Hispanic Caucus specifically **requested the White House to stand down** and allow Republican Senators and Congressmen, **warming to** the possibility of **a major deal** on immigration reform, to entertain the proposals put forward **by the Gang of Eight**. “It’s a tricky thing. We want him to lead, but Republicans are in a difficult position,” one unnamed Democratic source told CNN. This time, **the president complied**. **This is a major**, though **underreported**, **development. It may have preserved the political will** that seems to exist in Congress for a broad reform package that includes a pathway to citizenship for many illegal immigrants while strengthening border security: My fears that the president did not truly want progress on immigration reform, but would rather seek to isolate his opponents and preserve their opposition to comprehensive reform as a political cudgel for his party’s electoral purposes, were not unfounded. Obama has set dubious **precedent after precedent of wrenching legislative defeat from the jaws of victory**. On July 25, 2011, **with just days to go before the debt ceiling limit** was reached on August 2 of that year, President Barack Obama delivered a prime time address to the nation warning of the consequences of the House Republican plan to avert the catastrophe of default on the nation’s debt. The president did not offer a concrete plan of his own to avert the crisis, but endorsed Sen. Harry Reid’s (D-NV) proposal which he knew was unpalatable to Republicans. The president’s speech **hardened the positions of partisan members** of Congress. The framework of a bipartisan deal **was scuttled**. What was ultimately passed was not favorable to the White House and amounted to a Republican victory – one that Obama’s supporters on the left were roiled over. The episode amounted to the most significant defeat of Obama’s presidency to date: The president had learned his lesson.

**DOE spent 450 million dollars on SMR - Thumps the DA**

**Turn- SMR’s are popular in Congress**

**Sullivan, Stenger, and Roma ’10** (Mary Anne Sullivan is a partner in Hogan Lovells' energy practice in Washington, D.C. Congress, Daniel F. Stenger is a partner in Hogan Lovells' energy practice in Washington, D.C., Amy C. Roma is a senior associate in Hogan Lovells' energy practice in Washington, D.C., “Are Small Reactors the Next Big Thing in Nuclear?”, [www.pennenergy.com/index/power/display/3288852302/articles/electric-light-power/volume-88/issue-6/sections/are-small-reactors-the-next-big-thing-in-nuclear.html](http://www.pennenergy.com/index/power/display/3288852302/articles/electric-light-power/volume-88/issue-6/sections/are-small-reactors-the-next-big-thing-in-nuclear.html), November 2010, LEQ)

**SMRs have enjoyed** bipartisan support **in Congress. The House Committee on Science and Technology and the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee have approved similar legislation designed to promote the development and deployment of SMRs along the lines the DOE has proposed. Promoting SMR development in legislation has its price. The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that the Senate bill would cost $407 million over the next five years to support cost-sharing programs with private companies for the development of two standard SMR designs. Costs for the out-years were not included in the estimate, but the bill would require the DOE to obtain NRC design certifications for the reactors by 2018 and to secure combined construction and operating licenses by Jan. 1, 2021. If Congress can pass an energy bill, it seems likely the bill will** support **SMRs. Even in the absence of new authorizing legislation, however, appropriations bills that must be passed to keep the government running almost certainly will contain strong support for the DOE's research and development program for SMRs.**

**Military policy on energy isn’t subject to political debate**

**Heslop ‘11** (Janelle, Analyst at GreenOrder and LRN Advsior Group, “3 Reasons Why the Military is Leading the Clean-Energy Change” 10/11/11)

3. Even while national progress on energy policy stagnates in the midst of partisan debate, the military has the ability to make large, impactful and immediate investments in clean energy. This is because the military's commitment to renewable energy adoption, though fiscally subject to congressional approval, **is not dictated by the same political discourse** that is hindering the creation of a national energy bill. As a result, **the military does not need to wait for the political debate to complete its course,** and with its large purchasing power can confidently begin [investing](http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2011/10/12/3-reasons-why-military-is-leading-clean-energy-charge?page=0%2C1) in a clean energy future now. In fact, the military's goals on energy are far more aggressive than what seems politically feasible in the civilian world in the near term and will likely stay that way for some time.

**PC theory is wrong- winners win**

*-add green highlighting for immigration*

**Hirsh, 2-7** – National Journal chief correspondent, citing various political scientists

[Michael, former Newsweek senior correspondent, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, 2-9-13, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207, accessed 2-8-13, mss]

**There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital**

The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get itwrong. On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of **this** talk **will have no bearing on what actually happens** over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The **political tectonics** have **shift**ed **dramatically in very little time**. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, **political capital** is a concept that **misleads** far more than it enlightens. **It is** **distortionary**. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it **discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything**. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “**Winning wins.”** In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some **political scientists** **who study** the elusive calculus of **how to pass legislation** and run successful presidencies **say** that **political capital is**, at best, **an empty concept**, and that **almost nothing in** the **academic literature** successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. **Winning** on one issue often **changes the** **calculation** for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where **the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants**, and [they]he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the **other actors**” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may **change positions to get on the winning side**. **It’s a bandwagon effect**.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re]**he’s** aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)

[Matt note: gender paraphrased]

**2AC Russia Nuclear Leadership**

**Nuclear power’s expanding in the U.S. now**

**Ferguson ’12**

**(Charles D., Federation of the American Scientists, Public Interest Report, “Making the Case for**

**Nuclear Power in the United States”, Summer 2012,** <http://www.fas.org/pubs/pir/2012summer/Summer2012_PresidentMessage.pdf>)

Will nuclear power in the United States flourish or fade away? To paraphrase Mark Twain, “The news of nuclear power’s demise has been greatly exaggerated.” The United States still has the largest number of nuclear reactors in the world with 104 and almost 20 percent of its electricity is generated from nuclear power. Moreover, four new reactors are under construction: two at the Vogtle plant in Georgia and two at the Summer plant in South Carolina. One big reason these plants are moving forward is because the utilities can recoup some of the costs during construction. The regional regulatory authorities in the Southeastern United States have allowed such cost recovery. Four new reactors, however, will not be enough to keep nuclear power on pace to continue to generate about 20 percent of the nation’s electricity.

**Russia nuclear leadership is low now – failure to attract investors proves**

**The Lithuana Tribune 9/19/12 (“Nuclear Power Plant in Kaliningrad: Russian Cart in Front of a Horse”)**

Lithuania’s Parliamentary Security and Defence Committee chairman Arvydas Anušauskas has called the above-mentioned Kiriyenko’s letter a desperate PR stunt aimed at covering the fact that Russians cannot find investors. While democratic societies make important decisions by engaging in discussions, the Baltic NPP project is done the other way round: Putin signs a decree first and then licences are issued, based on the assumption that there must be a nuclear power plant on that particular spot. The massive electricity giant was planned and started without either proper transmission links or, even more importantly, investors to supply funds and export routes. Russia invited Lithuania and Poland to join the project in Kaliningrad, but the two declined. Rosatom would like to keep 51 percent of shares in the facility, while the rest should be sold. However, there do not seem to be any interested buyers. Previous media reports mentioned a number of Italian, Spanish, Czech, and German companies allegedly interested in the project. Asked to comment on investors last week, Timonov noted, twice: “Right now, as we speak, talks are underway with a Western company.” No further details. The Baltic NPP will cost 5 billion euros to build, Rosatom claims. Surprisingly little, bearing in mind that Lithuania might struggle to build a single reactor for the same sum. However, Gulyayev, one of construction leaders, responded to doubts with “What’s so surprising?” But later he added that the sum was but a current estimate. A connection with Poland would cost another half billion euros, a 600-1,000 MW cable to Germany would add 1-1.2 billion. Moscow claims there are no problems with financing – Rosatom will cover at least the first stage of the project. And if there are still no investors, Russians promise to find the money in their own coffers and transport electricity to “big” Russia. Again, via Lithuania, which is about to join the European network.

**Safety is the biggest hang up**

**Fischer 11 (Elisabeth, “Rise of a Giant: Russia’s Nuclear Future”)** <http://www.power-technology.com/features/featurerise-of-a-giant-russias-nuclear-future/>

As well as boosting its domestic nuclear sector, nuclear exports are a number one priority and Russia is marketing itself as a global expert of nuclear technology and engineering. Russia seems to be a civil nuclear superpower in the making, aiming to become known as a leading nation along with France, the UK and US. **But before it is taken seriously by the international community**, it needs to address concerns about its ageing power plants and safety measures, particularly in the light of the recent industry crisis triggered by the [disaster in Japan](http://www.power-technology.com/features/feature123016/).

**The plan solves that < insert card that says SMRs diffuse globally and are more safe>**

**Impact – D**

**Warming doesn't cause extinction**

**Lomborg ‘8** (Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated”, The Guardian, 8/15, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange>

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren’t for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a “catastrophe” and the beginning of the “extinction” of the human race. This **is simply** silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners’ scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is **wrong**. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell [he] is simply exaggerating **by a factor of** up to **400**. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the **models unanimously show that** Greenland’s ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world’s coastal infrastructure and much of the world’s farmland – “undoubtedly” causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years’ time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell’s claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For **the Copenhagen Consensus**, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, **did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits** accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now **outweigh the costs** (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. **This is simply not the end of humanity**. If anything, **global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation.** Further**, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.**

### Impact D

**Russian relations resilient – relationship defined by divergent cycles**

**Fenenko 11** (6/21/11, Alexei, leading researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for International Security, “The Cyclical Nature of Russian-American Relations,” <http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110621/164739508.html>)

There is nothing special or unusual about the current difficulties. Over the past twenty years, both Russia and the United States have experienced several cycles of convergence and divergence in their bilateral relations**.** It seems that Moscow and Washington are doomed to repeat these cycles time and again. Such changes in bilateral relations are no mere coincidence. Russia and the United States base their relations on mutual nuclear deterrence. The material and technical foundations for Russian-American relations differ little from those underpinning the Soviet-American relations of the 1980s. Thus, these cycles of Russian-American rapprochement are due to two factors. First comes the desire to consistently reduce aging nuclear systems so that during disarmament neither party risked destroying the military-strategic parity. Second, the reaction to a major military-political crisis after which the parties seek to reduce confrontation and update the rules of conduct in the military-political sphere. After confronting these tasks, Russia and the United States returned to a state of low intensity confrontation. The first rapprochement cycle was observed in the early 1990s. Yeltsin’s government needed U.S. support in recognizing Russia within the 1991 borders of the RSFSR. Boris Yeltsin also needed U.S. assistance in addressing the problem of the Soviet “nuclear legacy” and taking on the Supreme Council. The administrations of George Bush Senior and Bill Clinton were willing to help the Kremlin solve these problems. However, the Americans demanded major strategic concessions from Russia in return, outlined in START-III: making the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles a priority. The parties reached an unofficial compromise: U.S. recognition of the Russian leadership in exchange for the rapid decrease in Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (SNF). However, the stronger Russian state institutions became, the weaker the impetus to the rapprochement. In autumn 1994, Russia refused to ratify the original version of START-II and declared NATO’s eastward expansion unacceptable. The United States adopted the concept of “mutually assured safety” (January 1995) under which Russia’s democratic reforms qualified as inseparable from continued armament reduction. The “Overview of U.S. nuclear policy” in 1994 also confirmed that America deemed Russian strategic nuclear forces a priority threat. The crises that unfolded during the late 1990s in Iran and Yugoslavia were, like NATO expansion, the logical results of a restoration of the old approach to Soviet-American relations. It was actually the events of 1994, not 2000, that in fact predetermined the subsequent development of Russian-American relations. The second cycle of Russian-American rapprochement was also rooted in strategic considerations. In 2000 START-II and the ABM Treaty collapsed. Both Washington and Moscow were faced with the problem of their agreed decommissioning of nuclear systems dating back to the 1970s. These events pushed presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush to reach a strategic compromise at a meeting in Crawford (12 November 2001). The United States agreed to sign a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and Russia did not object to Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Instead of the ABM Treaty, the parties signed the Moscow Declaration on May 24, 2002, under which the United States pledged to consult with Russia on all issues pertaining to missile defense deployment. However, after the “compromise at Crawford,” the agenda for Russian-American rapprochement was exhausted. The disputes between Moscow and Washington over Iraq, Iran, Georgia, Ukraine and Beslan, which had been gathering steam since 2003, necessitated a return to the traditional format for Russian-American relations. At the Bratislava meeting (February 24, 2005) President Vladimir Putin refused to accept George W. Bush’s suggestion of including issues of fissile material safety in the agenda. Since then, the “rapprochement” between Russia and the U.S. has reached a dead end, including at the official level.

## 1AR

### Solvency

#### SMRs are cost effective

Cunningham 10/23/12- Nick policy analyst, American Security Project, Small modular reactors provide path forward for nuclear power, The Hill,<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/263585-small-modular-reactors-provide-path-forward-for-nuclear-power>

So, what do we do? One path forward for the nuclear industry is through the construction of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). SMRs are nuclear reactors that are intentionally designed to be less than 300-megawatts, or about one-third of the size of conventional large reactor. By making them small, they have several key benefits not available to large reactors. These issues are discussed at length in a new American Security Project (ASP) report, “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power.” First, SMRs offer flexibility. Since they are small, they can be added to the electric grid incrementally. Slow incremental additions better match the slow energy demand growth in the United States, which is projected to be less than 1% per year. Utilities have little interest in building a huge nuclear reactor when demand is not rising quickly enough to justify the investment. Second, SMRs are designed with several safety features that are an improvement over large reactors. By using simpler designs with fewer coolant pipes and components, the risk of a safety accident declines. Third, and perhaps most importantly, SMRs have an advantage in cost over large reactors. While a typical large reactor can cost between $6 and $9 billion, an SMR has an estimated price tag of only $250 million for a 100-megawatt reactor. With smaller upfront costs and shorter construction timeframes, utilities can get loans with lower interest rates.

### Heg strat inev

#### Hegemonic strategy inevitable

Calleo, 10 Director – European Studies Program and Professor @ SAIS,

(David P, “American Decline Revisited,” *Survival*, 52:4, 215 – 227)

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world's great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a threat to the world economy in general. To lead itself and the world into a more secure future the United States must put aside its old, unmeasured geopolitical ambitions paid for by unlimited cheap credit. Instead, the United States needs a more balanced view of its role in history. But America's post-Soviet pundits have, unfortunately, proved more skilful at perpetuating outmoded dreams of past glory than at promoting the more modest visions appropriate to a plural future. One can always hope that newer generations of Americans will find it easier to adjust to pluralist reality. The last administration, however, was not very encouraging in this regard. III What about Barack Obama? So far, his economic policy has shown itself probably more intelligent and certainly more articulate than his predecessor's. His thinking is less hobbled by simple-minded doctrines. It accepts government's inescapable role in regulating markets and providing a durable framework for orderly governance and societal fellowship. To be sure, the Obama administration, following in the path of the Bush administration, has carried short-term counter-cyclical stimulation to a previously unimagined level. Perhaps so radical an expansion of credit is unavoidable under present circumstances. The administration is caught between the need to rebalance by scaling back and the fear that restraint applied now will trigger a severe depression. Obama's chief aide, Rahm Emanuel, is famous for observing: 'Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are opportunities to do big things.'26 So far, Obama's administration has made use of its crisis to promote an unprecedented expansion of welfare spending.27 Much of the spending is doubtless good in itself and certainly serves the administration's strong counter-cyclical purposes. But at some point the need to pass from expansion to stabilisation will presumably be inescapable. Budget cuts will have to be found somewhere, and demographic trends suggest that drastic reductions in civilian welfare spending are unlikely. Elementary prudence might suggest that today's financial crisis is an ideal occasion for America's long-overdue retreat from geopolitical overstretch, a time for bringing America's geopolitical pretensions into harmony with its diminishing foreign possibilities and expanding domestic needs. The opportunities for geopolitical saving appear significant. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), current military plans will require an average military budget of $652bn (in 2010 dollars) each year through 2028. The estimate optimistically assumes only 30,000 troops will be engaged abroad after 2013. As the CBO observes, these projections exceed the peak budgets of the Reagan administration's military build-up of the mid-1980s (about $500bn annually in 2010 dollars). This presumes a military budget consuming 3.5% of GDP through 2020.28 Comparable figures for other nations are troubling: 2.28% for the United Kingdom, 2.35% for France, 2.41% for Russia and 1.36% for China.29 Thus, while the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does not yet seem to have resulted in a more modest view of the country's place in the world, or a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation.

#### A weak military is worse

**Feaver ‘5** - Professor of Political Science at Duke (Peter, Armed servants: agency, oversight, and civil-military relations, p. 4-5)

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. One purpose behind establishing the military in the first place is the need, or perceived need, for military force, either to attack other groups or to ward off attacks. The military primarily exists as a guard against disaster and should always be ready even if it is never used. Moreover, its strength should be sized appropriately to meet the threats confronting the polity. It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, **an inadequate** military **institution** may **be worse than none at all. It could be a paper tiger inviting outside aggression: strong enough**in appearance **to threaten powerful enemies, but not strong enough** in fact **to defend** against their predations. Alternatively, **it could lull leaders into a false confidence, leading them to rash behavior** and then failing in the ultimate military contest.

### China

**US won’t intervene to help Taiwan**

**Sollenberger**, student at the Johns Hopkins University, graduate Swarthmore and analyst, **10** [Matthew, spring, “Challenging US Command of the Commons:Evolving Chinese defense technologies as a threat to American hegemony?”, <http://bcjournal.org/2010/challenging-us-command-of-the-commons/>]

**The advancement of Chinese military capabilities in the areas of information warfare, anti-access** measures, **and strategic nuclear forces has** substantially **altered the strategic environment surrounding a US-China conflict, particularly in the Chinese littoral theaters**. **By hampering US intelligence gathering and communication assets and using anti-access measures, China could delay a US military response to a** possible **confrontation across the Taiwan Strait**. Given the Chinese-Taiwanese balance of forces, which has tilted significantly against Taiwan in the last years, **any delay in the US response to such a crisis could allow China to achieve its unification goals militarily and present the US with a fait accompli**. Meanwhile, **China’s enhanced capability to inflict substantial damage on US military and civilian assets at different levels of escalation has increased the costs of a potential military conflic**t between the US and China **and thus, may reduce the readiness of US decision-makers to intervene in favor of Taiwan** – **particularly given China’s evolving ability to withstand US nuclear coercion and deny the US potential benefits from escalation**. **China has thus effectively challenged US command of the commons, contesting US military power in several key areas.** By definition, this erodes one of the pillars of hegemony, namely unrivaled military prowess.

### No impact Science

**No impact to science diplomacy**

**Dickson 9** [David, Direction Science & Development Network. June 2, 2009, “Science diplomacy: the case for caution”, [http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/new- frontiers-in-science-diplomacy-2009](http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/new-%20frontiers-in-science-diplomacy-2009), SM]

One of the frustrations of meetings at which scientists gather to discuss policy-related issues is the speed with which **the requirements for evidence-based discussion they would expect in a professional context can go out of the window.** Such has been the issue over the past two days in the meeting jointly organised in London by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Royal Society on the topic “New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy“. There has been much lively discussion on the value of international collaboration in achieving scientific goals, on the need for researchers to work together on the scientific aspects of global challenges such as climate change and food security, and on the importance of science capacity building in developing countries in order to make this possible. But there remained little evidence at the end of the meeting on how useful it was to lump all these activities together under the umbrella term of “science diplomacy”. More significantly, although numerous claims were made during the conference about the broader social and political value of scientific collaboration – for example, in establishing a framework for collaboration in other areas, and in particular reducing tensions between rival countries – **little was produced to demonstrate whether this hypothesis is true.** If it is not, then **some of the arguments made on behalf of “science diplomacy”, and in particular its value as a mechanism for exercising “soft power” in foreign policy, do not stand up to close scrutiny**. Indeed, a case can be made that where scientific projects have successfully involved substantial international collaboration, such success is often **heavily dependent on a prior political commitment to cooperation, rather than a mechanism for securing cooperation where the political will is lacking**. Three messages appeared to emerge from the two days of discussion. Firstly, where the political will to collaborate does exist, a joint scientific project can be a useful expression of that will. Furthermore, it can be an enlightening experience for all those directly involved. But it is **seldom a magic wand that can secure broader cooperation** where none existed before. Secondly, “science diplomacy” will only become recognised as a useful activity if it is closely defined to cover specific situations (such as the negotiation of major international scientific projects or collaborative research enterprises). As an umbrella term embracing the many ways in which science interacts with foreign policy, it loses much of its impact, and thus its value. Finally, when it comes to promoting the use of science in developing countries, a terminology based historically on maximising self-interest – the ultimate goal of the diplomat – and on practices through which the rich have almost invariably ended up exploiting the poor, is likely to be counterproductive. In other words, the discussion seemed to confirm that “science diplomacy” has a legitimate place in the formulation and implementation of policies for science (just as there is a time and place for exercising “soft power” in international relations). But the dangers of going beyond this – including the danger of distorting the integrity of science itself, and even alienating potential partners in collaborative projects, particularly in the developing world – were also clearly exposed.

### UQ

#### Won’t pass – GOP opposition.

Lillis 1-29. [Mike, congressional reporter, "Despite momentum, tough fight looms for immigration-reform advocates" The Hill -- thehill.com/homenews/news/279761-despite-momentum-tough-fight-looms-over-immigration-reform]

Despite the momentum growing behind comprehensive immigration reform, advocates face high hurdles in their fight for changes on an issue that has been a political third rail on Capitol Hill for more than a decade.¶ While President Obama and congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle are optimistic they can enact the reforms that have eluded Washington policymakers for years, the immediate pushback from some conservatives is a clear signal that the debate will be fierce and no changes will come easily — or at all.¶ To be sure, November's elections, which saw Hispanic voters come out in heavy favor of Obama and the Democrats, have made the political environment much more conducive to reform than the last time Congress took up a comprehensive immigration package roughly eight years ago.¶ But President George W. Bush was similarly optimistic about the chances of his proposal at the time — “I’ll see you at the bill-signing,” he famously said — only to see the effort fall at the hands of his fellow Republicans in the House.¶ Immigration reformers on both sides of the aisle are hoping for a different ending this time around, but they're also not holding their breath.¶ Former Rep. Chris Cannon (R-Utah), an original supporter of the DREAM Act and a sponsor of several other bills, said November's election results were "like a two-by-four to the forehead" of Republican leaders who "have realized how stupid their position has been." ¶ But he warned that conservative Republicans could still sink the effort to overhaul the system.¶ "The intransigents who would rather carp about a potential problem than look for a solution, they'll do whatever they can [to kill the proposed reforms]," Cannon said Monday by phone. "I think it's fair to question their political motivations.

#### Reform won’t pass – long timeframe to a vote.

Cowan 2-5. [Richard, journalist, "House Republican warns against rushing immigration reform" Reuters -- www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-usa-immigration-idUSBRE9130V620130205]

The immigration system is badly in need of reform but Congress should not rush legislation to President Barack Obama, who is demanding prompt action, a leading Republican said on Tuesday.¶ In the first of a series of hearings planned by the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Chairman Bob Goodlatte warned a packed hearing room that his panel "needs to take the time to learn from the past so that our efforts to reform our immigration laws do not repeat the same mistakes."¶ Obama and many of his fellow Democrats in Congress are pushing for passage this year of comprehensive reforms that would include putting 11 million illegal residents on a path to U.S. citizenship.¶ Pro-immigrant groups have been pushing for action for years without success. But November elections, in which Hispanic-Americans voted overwhelmingly for Democrats, gave new impetus for legislation. They also jarred Republicans into acknowledging the need for action - a turnaround after their presidential hopefuls campaigned on tough anti-immigration platforms in 2011 and 2012.¶ But there still are significant disagreements between the two parties over how to balance the need for border security and regularize the status of illegal immigrants. The most contentious issue is the possible legalization of those who emigrated to the United States without permission.¶ Goodlatte acknowledged that Congress must address how to deal with those who have come to the United States illegally, many of whom now have deep roots, with children attending American public schools.¶ But the Virginia Republican noted that members of Congress "have a lot of questions about how a large-scale legalization program would work, what it would cost and how it would prevent illegal immigration in the future."¶ Goodlatte's remarks focused on the need to enforce immigration laws and to accommodate more foreign workers with high-tech skills, which are needed by corporations in the Silicon Valley and elsewhere, and farm workers.¶ Some Republicans are calling for more modest steps in dealing with the 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States who live under the threat of deportation. Instead of putting them on a path to citizenship, some have suggested a permanent work visa for them.¶ FRANCE, GERMANY WARNING¶ But Representative Zoe Lofgren of California, the senior Democrat on the House judiciary subcommittee that will delve into legislative fixes, warned: "Partial legalization, as some are suggesting, is a dangerous path and we need only look at France and Germany to see how unwise it is to create a permanent underclass" in the United States.¶ A bipartisan group of senators last week unveiled a comprehensive reform plan that they hope to translate into legislation in coming weeks. Significant questions were unresolved in their outline, including what kind of system to create for allowing future visa applicants.¶ Senate Democrats hope to pass a bill by mid-year with a large, bipartisan vote that could improve chances for passage of a bill in the Republican-controlled House.¶ However, House Republican leaders have not committed to passing an immigration bill this year.

### Link

**No link – plan doesn’t cost money**

**DOE 11,**

 “Funding Federal Energy and Water Projects”, July, <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/52085.pdf>

On-site renewable PPAs allow Federal agencies to fund on-site renewable energy projects with no upfront capital costs incurred. A developer installs a renewable energy system on agency property under an agreement that the agency will purchase the power generated by the system. The agency pays for the system through these power purchase payments over the life of the contract. After installation, the developer owns, operates, and maintains the system for the life of the contract. The PPA price is typically determined through a competitive procurement process.